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Abstract The winter of 2013/2014 saw a series of severe storms hit the UK, leading to
widespread flooding, a major emergency response and extensive media exposure. Previous
research indicates that experiencing extreme weather events has the potential to heighten
engagement with climate change, however the process by which this occurs remains largely
unknown, and establishing a clear causal relationship from experience to perceptions is
methodologically challenging. The UK winter flooding offered a natural experiment to
examine this question in detail. We compare individuals personally affected by flooding
(n = 162) to a nationally representative sample (n = 975). We show that direct experience of
flooding leads to an overall increased salience of climate change, pronounced emotional
responses and greater perceived personal vulnerability and risk perceptions. We also present
the first evidence that direct flooding experience can give rise to behavioural intentions beyond
individual sustainability actions, including support for mitigation policies, and personal
climate adaptation in matters unrelated to the direct experience.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the effect of experiencing extreme weather on personal engagement with
climate change. We address this by focusing on a specific series of flooding events that
occurred in the UK in late 2013/early 2014. These events were brought about by a series of
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major storms hitting the UK in quick succession, leading to extensive and persistent flooding
events across England and Wales. The impacts were consistent with projections for increased
UK flood risk under climate change (Huntingford et al. 2014), led to a major emergency
response, and prompted Prime Minister David Cameron and national media to attribute the
events, at least in part, to climate change (BBC Online 2014). Subsequent climate model
simulations indicate that the risks of extreme precipitation in Southern England at the time
were heightened significantly by anthropogenic warming (Schaller et al. 2016).
The notion that a person’s ‘experience’with weather-related phenomena provides a potentially
important route to engagement with climate change has been suggested often (Lorenzoni and
Pidgeon 2006; Weber 2010; McDonald et al 2015; Reser et al 2014). This hypothesis is rooted in
literature which shows that people can use direct personal experiences, in addition to secondary
sources (e.g. scientists, media), to understand otherwise abstract risks. Such personal experiences
may help anchor people’s understanding of climate change by making the risk more concrete and
familiar (Smith and Joffe 2013; Bickerstaff and Walker 2001; Spence et al. 2012).
Many studies have now examined connections between variations in actual and perceived
temperature and perceptions of climate change (e.g. Capstick and Pidgeon 2014; Zaval et al.
2014; Howe et al. 2013; Li et al. 2011). However, while climate change is expected to lead to
aggregate global temperature increases, one of the principal ways it is likely to be made
concrete for ordinary people at a regional level is through extreme weather events (EWEs)
(Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012). This distinction is important because experiences with EWEs
might hold the potential for more profound changes in people’s perceptions of climate change
more generally. EWEs may act as a strong ‘signal’ or ‘focusing event’ (Renn 2011; November
et al. 2009) whereby future climatic events are made more imaginable, indicating dramatic
changes to familiar and local places, in turn heightening the sense of risk posed by climate
change. EWEs are also often associated with changed socio-political contexts (media cover-
age, institutional responses etc.) which themselves constitute important influences on people’s
perceptions (cf. Pidgeon et al. 2003).
The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. In the first study to examine this question,
conducted 3 years after major UK flooding in 2000, Whitmarsh (2008) reported no systematic
relationship between respondents in flooded and non-flooded areas and their climate beliefs.
More recent studies do however suggest that EWE experiences can increase belief in climate
change and promote support for sustainable behaviour change (Myers et al. 2013; Spence et al.
2011; Broomwell et al. 2015; Taylor et al. 2014a; Lujala et al. 2015). However, a number of
conceptual and methodological aspects of these previous studies deserve closer attention.
1.1 Conceptual considerations
While there has been a focus on establishing empirical associations between EWE
experiences and climate change perceptions, the mechanisms by which this might occur
remain relatively untested. One aspect that has received some attention in the literature is
the possible role of heuristics in understanding the process by which experiences might
affect risk perceptions or engagement. Indeed, there are clear parallels between assump-
tions made about the role of EWEs impacting climate change perceptions and psycholog-
ical literature on the availability heuristic, which suggests that people’s judgements about
risk are influenced by the ease with which relevant events come to mind (Weber 2010;
Keller et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2014a). As such, experiences of an EWE might make
climate risk more cognitively available or salient in people’s minds, particularly where
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such a link has also been made within the media or the statements of prominent figures.
We already know that following flooding experiences, people are more likely to perceive
future flood risk and to buy insurance (in effect, an adaptation to that experience) due to
the increased salience of flooding (Browne and Hoyt 2000). Equally, if a person has
experienced EWEs, this could lead to heightened salience of climate change, making it
easier to envisage other ways in which climate change might affect them personally.
A second heuristic, potentially acting as a parallel mechanism, or mediator, of the
relationship between experience and risk perceptions, is the affect heuristic (Finucane
et al. 2000). Here it is proposed that experiential learning is facilitated through an
emotional response, which heightens the importance of the experience and its subsequent
influence on attitudes towards risk (Weber 2010; Keller et al. 2006), whereby it is easier
to remember affect-laden events. The intense emotional responses known to accompany
flooding experiences (e.g. Walker et al. 2011) provide a potentially powerful mechanism
linking these events with responses to climate change, and in a way that is likely absent
in other types of climate ‘experiences’ such as temperature changes. We would expect
those with strong direct emotional experiences of extreme weather to be more likely to
have heightened perceptions of the event and its possible related risks (in this case
climate change).
The increased salience of climate change deriving from direct experience might also
manifest in terms of other forms of engagement. For example, many studies on climate change
perceptions have noted that climate change ‘issue salience’ is low when compared with other
issues (e.g. the economy, migration, health; see Pidgeon 2012; Taylor et al. 2014b; Capstick
et al. 2015b). Accordingly, direct experiences might influence the relative importance of
climate change in relation to other priorities in life, alongside its personal salience as a risk
issue. Previous research, by contrast, has tended to focus primarily on changes to epistemic
beliefs (i.e. whether people accept climate change is a physical reality; see Myers et al. 2013).
It would be fruitful, therefore, to take a broader view of personal engagement with climate
change, representing a shift of focus – moving away from asking whether ‘seeing is believing’
and asking instead whether experiences lead to engaging and acting.
A final consideration in the current study is to examine not only personal salience and
mitigation intentions, but also attitudes towards wider climate policies as well as adaptation
intentions to ostensibly unrelated climate events (in particular heatwaves). It is conceivable
that if an EWE experience heightens climate change issue salience among those affected, this
might in turn translate into responses to other types of climate risks. Such a link between EWE
experience and wider climate adaptation has received very limited attention to date (Reser et al.
2014; Blennow et al. 2012) but has potentially important implications for future resilience
planning and wider public engagement (Moser 2014).
The discussion above leads to the following four hypotheses. People with direct personal
experience of the 2013/14 winter flooding, when compared to a sample without direct
experience, will have: (Hypothesis 1 – Issue Salience) increased issue salience of climate
change in general, and increased salience relative to other issues; (Hypothesis 2 – Risk
Perceptions) higher perceptions of general climate change risks; (Hypothesis 3 – Emotional
Engagement and Climate Change Mitigation) higher levels of emotional engagement with
the flooding events, which in turn will be positively associated with (as a mediating variable)
higher climate change risk perceptions, mitigation intentions and policy support; and (Hy-
pothesis 4 – Non-Flood Adaptation Intentions) higher intentions to engage in non-flood
related climate adaptation measures (in this case regarding heatwaves).
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1.2 Methodological considerations
In order to outline our approach to testing these hypotheses, it is important to draw attention to
several shortcomings in the methodology used within the research literature to date. First, an
important limitation has been the wide-ranging way in which experience has been conceptualised,
measured and interpreted.Many studies have used ambiguous or loosely-defined constructs or left
participants to judge for themselves what might constitute ‘experience’ of extreme weather (e.g.
Dai et al. 2015; Rudman et al. 2013; Spence et al. 2011; Taylor et al. 2014a; van der Linden 2014;
Lujala et al. 2015; Whitmarsh 2008). Other studies have asked participants to state whether or not
they have personally experienced global warming (e.g. Akerlof et al. 2013; Blennow et al. 2012;
Broomwell et al. 2015; Myers et al. 2013; Reser et al. 2014), which in effect confounds both
experience and a global warming belief in a single item – this is particularly problematic where an
attempt is made to infer a causal link between these two constructs. Likewise, items that directly
include an explicit ‘climate change attribution’ element (i.e. whether an event is attributed to
climate change) can shed light on the extent to which people believe climate change has
manifested in their own lives (or the extent to which events are consciously attributed to climate
change), but subsequent linkages with perceptions or actions on climate change are more
problematic to interpret. This is because, in part, such items are particularly susceptible to response
biases: those already concerned about or accepting of climate change are more likely to consider
particular EWEs to represent manifestations of it (Corner et al. 2012; Capstick and Pidgeon 2014).
In other words, it is entirely possible that self-report of ‘experience’ simply acts as a substitute for
people’s climate change beliefs more generally. It is not surprising under such circumstances to
find that this type of ‘experience’ measure is sometimes the most significant predictor of other
climate change belief measures.
More generally, we also know that information relevant to climate change tends to be
interpreted according to pre-existing social, cultural and political beliefs (Corner et al. 2012;
McCright and Dunlap 2011; Kahan 2014). Even if measures of experience do not explicitly
refer to climate change, they are still susceptible to substantial biased reporting if they are left
open to interpretation. This includes measures that do not specify the type of experience (e.g.
property damage, travel disruption, emotional reaction), the type of EWE (e.g. flooding,
drought, storms), or that include vague or long timescales. If undefined then the participant
must themselves decide what constitutes a relevant EWE experience. In the first study to show
an association between self-reported flood experience and climate change attitudes, Spence
et al. (2011) concede that their interpretation suffers from precisely this causality issue. People
already concerned about climate change may have been more likely to report that they had
been impacted by ‘flooding in their area’; a suggestion which subsequent studies have
corroborated (Blennow et al. 2012).
Taking account of these methodological concerns, we argue that clear and concrete
measures of experience are necessary if research is to draw valid conclusions about how those
experiences might affect beliefs (rather than vice versa). Although all self-report measures
have limitations, it is likely that precisely-worded measures of direct physical experience and
material impacts of an event, well-defined in terms of concrete personal effects and damage,
are less susceptible to biased reporting, providing the best proxy available for direct measures
of ‘objective’ experience1.
1 Given that, for both ethical and practical reasons, direct observation of the physical impacts upon research
participants during an event is highly unlikely.
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Additionally, a much-overlooked methodological consideration is questionnaire structure,
particularly the potential influence that the order of question presentation might have on
responses. If one is interested in the extent to which a particular experience affects attitudes
towards climate change, then measures gauging this experience should be placed subsequent
to these more subjective measures. This is because the placing of a measure early on in a
questionnaire has the potential to confound findings through inadvertently leading respondents
to consider this experience when reporting on their climate beliefs. As a result of this
consideration, we placed key measures of climate beliefs as the very first items on the survey,
so that these could be elicited independently from any mention of flooding2.
The present study seeks to examine the four hypotheses above, using a survey-based
approach, while also addressing the methodological issues raised in this section. We apply a
quasi-experimental design comparing a nationally representative British sample to individuals
who had directly experienced the 2013/2014 UK flooding, taking care to: (a) measure key
climate change perceptions using both prompted and unprompted questions beforemaking any
reference to extreme weather or flooding; and (b) employ a highly specific measure of direct
flooding experience which is unlikely to be influenced by a person’s beliefs or preceding
responses about climate change.
2 Methods
The survey instrument was developed by the research team and refined after input from the
social research company (Ipsos Mori) and advisory panel. The full questionnaire is detailed in
Capstick et al. (2015a).
2.1 Sampling
Computer Assisted Personal Interviews were conducted between 28 August and 31 October
2014 by experienced Ipsos Mori household interviewers and took 35 min on average to
complete. The study design incorporated a nationally representative quota sample with 1002
interviews. Sample points were selected randomly using Double Output Areas (OAs). An OA
represents the lowest level at which census information is published, and on which demo-
graphic quotas can be set. The Double OAs were stratified by social grade and rurality within
regions. Quotas were set on age, gender and working status based on the local population of
the Double OA, as published in the 2011 Census. Half of all interviews were completed on
weekday evenings or at weekends. No incentives were offered.
To obtain an additional sample of respondents with direct experience of the flooding, five
flood-affected areas were chosen to represent heavily affected areas with diverse experiences.
These areas were chosen after consultation with the study’s advisory panel and Ipsos Mori,
who had knowledge of where the flooding had occurred during the specified time frame.
Media reports and data from the UK Environment Agency were then used to verify that
flooding had indeed occurred in the sampled postcode areas (Environment Agency 2014)3.
2 In addition, participants were recruited to the survey without any mention being made of either climate change
or flooding.
3 Postcode data of flood-affected areas as well as the database used to verify flooding had occurred is available
from the authors upon request.
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The five areas included the City of Hull, adjacent to the river Humber (n = 200), an area along
the River Thames west of London between Sunbury and Windsor (n = 199), along the River
Severn between Tewkesbury and Gloucester (n = 198), in the town and region of Aberystwyth
in Ceredigion, Wales (n = 200), and along the coast at Dawlish in Devon (n = 198).
2.2 Defining a flood-affected sample
The survey measured the occurrence of clearly defined, direct physical impacts of flooding on
participants. Respondents were asked:
BWas your current or previous property affected by the floods between November 2013
and February 2014? This could include any land surrounding your home such as a
garden or drive. If you live in a flat it might include communal areas such as a car park
or hallway. Please also answer yes if you stopped the water from flooding your property
by using some form of flood defence such as sand bags or a flood gate.^
Respondents who reported direct impacts on their property included 135 respondents from
the flood-affected areas and 27 respondents from the national sample (n = 162)4. We compared
this materially and directly affected sample to the national sample (N = 975: the nationally
representative sample minus those who reported being directly affected).
We opted to compare these two samples because this provides a clear distinction between
those with and without direct flood experience. The remaining participants in the oversampled
flood-affected areas that are not included in this analysis are likely to have had close
encounters with the flooding in other ways (e.g. through friends and family; Paranjothy
2011). These experiences are important but more susceptible to biased responding and are
outside the scope of the current analyses.
The two samples naturally vary in terms of their geographic distribution across Great
Britain (the national sample was drawn to be representative across regions, whereas the
flood-affected sample was primarily drawn from the five specified flood-affected areas). We
cannot fully rule out that the geographic location of the samples contributed to any perceptual
differences found (see section 4), however by drawing the flood-affected sample from multiple
locations, we reduce the likelihood of one location-specific factor affecting the analysis (e.g.
the flood-affected areas included coastal and non-coastal areas). We further conducted an
analysis comparing the two samples on a number of demographic and other variables. These
comparisons reveal only small differences across the two samples, with the exception of social
grade, an indicator of affluence (Online Resource 1 for the full analysis). This variable is
therefore subsequently included as a covariate in all analyses.
2.3 Measures
Items and response scales used to measure climate change perceptions are detailed in Table 1.
4 Postcode prefix data was used to verify if these 27 respondents were living in areas that had been affected by
flooding in the specified time frame. Using Environment Agency data, 13 respondents were verified to be living
in affected areas, 2 had postcode data missing and 12 could not be verified in this way. It is possible either that
these 12 respondents nevertheless experienced flooding, or that they misreported their flood experience. Given
the specific nature of the question used to measure experience, and acknowledging that the Environment Agency
database of flood affected areas may not have comprehensively pinpointed all affected properties, we opted to
still include these 12 respondents in our flood-affected sample.
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Behavioural intentions were measured using a four-item scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.66):
BIn the next few years, how likely or unlikely would you be to do each of the following?
Table 1 Comparisons between the flood affected (n = 162) and national samples (n = 975) across climate change
perception measures
Theorised construct Item wording and response scale Mean (+/- SDs) Analysis of
variance results
Concern How concerned, if at all, are you
about climate change, which is
sometimes referred to as ‘global
warning’? (very concerned, fairly
concerned, not very concerned,
not at all concerned)
National = 2.83 (0.83)
Flood affected = 3.04
(0.81)
F(1,1119) = 6.71
p = 0.010
Temporal
distance
When, if at all, do you think the UK
will start feeling the effects of
climate change? (We are already
feeling the effects, in the next 20
years,25 years, 50 years, 100 years,
beyond the next 100 years, never)
National = 5.92 (1.56)
Flood affected = 6.18
(1.37)
F(1,1081) = 3.82p
= 0.051
Threat to self,
UK, others
People in developing countries: How
serious a threat, if at all, is climate
change to each of the following?
(5-point scale: strongly agree to
strongly disagree)
National = 3.77 (0.95)
Flood affected = 3.84
(0.93)
F(1,1077) = 0.49p
= 0.483
The UK as a whole: How serious a
threat, if at all, is climate change to
each of the following? (5-point scale:
strongly agree to strongly disagree)
National = 3.17 (0.94)
Flood affected = 3.37
(0.93)
F(1,1109) = 5.30p
= 0.021
You and your family: How serious a
threat, if at all, is climate change to
each of the following? (5-point scale:
strongly agree to strongly disagree)
National = 2.73 (0.97)
Flood affected = 3.08
(1.07)
F(1,1119) = 17.82,
p = 0.000
Threat to
local area
My local area is more likely to be
affected by climate change than
most other places in Britain.
(5-point scale: strongly agree
to strongly disagree)
National = 2.32 (1.04)
Flood affected = 3.40
(1.18)
F(1,1114) = 133.40,
p = 0.000
Personal
issue salience
Scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.794):
- Discuss climate change with your
family and friends? : How often,
if at all, do you currently do each
of the following?
- Read and think about climate change? :
How often, if at all, do you currently
do each of the following? (5-point
scale: strongly agree to strongly
disagree)
National = 3.78 (1.41)
Flood affected = 4.23
(1.31)
F(1,1128) = 9.82p
= 0.002
Day-to-day
worry
I worry about climate change on a
day-to-day basis. (5-point scale:
strongly agree to strongly disagree)
National = 2.29 (1.13)
Flood affected = 2.44
(1.20)
F(1,1117) = 1.51p
= 0.220
Test results in bold indicate significant differences between samples after Holm’s sequential Bonferroni adjust-
ments to p-values (new significance level p < 0.006). Analysis of variance results are the follow-up tests to a
significant multivariate analysis (F(8983) = 15.96, p < 0.001), and include social grade and age as covariates. All
variables are coded whereby higher numbers respond to higher levels of concern or agreement
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Change to a ‘green’ energy supplier which would reduce the impact on the environment
from the electricity you use in your home; cut down the amount you travel by car; buy
appliances that are more energy-efficient; reduce the amount of energy you use at home^
(5-point scale: very likely to very unlikely).
Policy support for climate change mitigation actions was measured using a three-item
scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.65): support for Broad pricing schemes to reduce traffic in town
and city centres; tax increases to pay for more renewable energy; the UK signing up to
international agreements to limit carbon emissions^ (5-point scale: strongly support to
strongly oppose).
Non-flood related climate change adaptation intentions were measured using a two-item
scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.83): BFind out about how to avoid health problems during heat waves;
seek advice on how to cope with heatwaves and water shortages^ (4-point scale: ‘It is very
unlikely I would do this’ to ‘I am intending to do this’ with an additional option of ‘I don’t
think this is relevant to me’).
A negative emotion response scale (Cronbach’s α = 0.83) combines answers to the ques-
tions Bwhen you think about the floods how strongly, if at all, have you felt each of the
following emotions?^ (10 point scale: not at all to extremely) for five emotions (sadness,
anxiety, anger, helplessness, distress).
3 Findings
We compare the directly flood-affected sample (n = 162) to a nationally representative
sample without flooding experience (n = 975) to determine the influence of flood expe-
rience on climate change issue salience and perceptual measures as discussed in
section 3.1.
3.1 Hypothesis 1: Issue salience
At the very beginning of the survey, and prior to any mention of climate change or
flooding, we asked respondents to state the three most important issues facing the UK
today, and in the next 20 years. Responses were coded blind to respondents’ self-reported
experience of flooding. As these questions were open-ended (respondents answered in
their own words) we consider these measures of unprompted issue salience (Hypothesis
1). Binary logistic regression analyses on responses to these questions reveal the fol-
lowing: the proportion of those presenting climate change as among the top three most
important issues today did not differ significantly between the samples (b = 0.26, odds
ratio = 1.30, p = 0.28). However, the odds of flood-affected respondents mentioning
climate change within the top three issues over the next 20 years was 70 % higher
relative to the national sample (b = 0.53, odds ratio = 1.70, p < 0.01); see Fig. 1. This
finding indicates that climate change was indeed a more salient topic for those who had
directly experienced flooding, although only when judged at longer timeframes. Males
and those in more affluent social grades were also more likely to spontaneously mention
climate change as one of the most important issues facing Britain in both questions (see
Online Resource 2 for details).
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3.2 Hypothesis 2: Risk perceptions
Hypothesis 2 predicts higher climate risk perceptions in the flood-affected sample. In order to
compare concern and other relevant risk perception variables between the flood-affected and
national samples, multivariate analysis of variance was used. Here we consider several standard
constructs to take a broad view on engagement with climate change, including general concern
about climate change, perceived temporal distance of climate change, and risk perceptions in the
form of threat to developing countries, to the UK and to the self and family as well as to the local
area. Personal engagement with climate change is measured using two indicators; one captures
more cognitive aspects (the extent to which people read and talk about climate change) and one
captures more affective aspects (worry about climate change day-to-day).
Differences between the two samples on these measures were all in the expected
direction, and significant overall in a multivariate analysis incorporating all dependent
variables (F(8983) = 15.96, p < 0.01); follow-up analyses of differences in individual
items are displayed in Table 1 (Bonferroni correction applied).
We observe a pattern of differences whereby there was heightened personal salience of climate
change within the flood-affected sample compared to the national sample (corresponding to
indicators of personal issue salience, and threat to self and one’s local area). Differences in climate
change concern are of marginal significance (p < 0.01 not meeting the adjusted significance
threshold for multiple tests). However, the two samples did not differ on items of less immediate
relevance at the personal level (threat to the UK and developing countries and perceived temporal
distance). A lack of differences on some measures may be due to a ceiling effect; for example,
most people across both samples believed that the UK is already experiencing climate change
impacts. The only indicator of personal engagement with climate change that did not differ across
the two samples was that of worry about climate change on a day-to-day basis.
In conclusion, our data shows those in the flood-affected sample displaying a heightened
personal risk of climate change, however the samples do not differ significantly on whether it
is an immediate risk causing worry on a daily basis.
3.3 Hypothesis 3. Emotional engagement and climate change mitigation
Having identified these differences between the two samples, we next examine which
key perceptual variables mediate the effect of experience on climate relevant mitigation
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intentions and policy support (Hypothesis 3). We especially consider the role played by
heightened personal salience of climate change as found in the previous analysis.
Accordingly, to capture affective processes more directly, we include a measure of
negative emotional responses to the flooding itself. As expected, the flood-affected
sample reported higher negative emotional responses (mean = 4.65, SD = 2.56) compared
to the national sample (mean = 3.90, SD = 2.12), F(1,1128) = 88.58, p < 0.01).
c’=
c’=-
c’=
Fig. 2 Mediation models examining flooding experience’s impact on (a) behavioural intentions to act on climate
change and (b) support for climate change mitigation policies and (c) non-flood related adaptation intentions
(heat wave). Values provided are unstandardized beta weights indicating the strength of the relationship between
variables.Heavy lines indicate a significant pathway (* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01); c’ represents the direct effect of
experience on behavioural intentions/policy support (holding other factors constant), c represents the total effect
of experience on intentions/support
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To test the hypothesised relationships, mediation analysis was conducted. Specifically the
analyses examine the direct and indirect effects of flood experience on mitigation intentions
and policy support, with negative emotions associated with the flooding, climate change
concern5 and personal issue salience included as mediators. We used the PROCESS add-on
for SPSS (Hayes 2013) and allowed all mediator residuals to covary and estimated the direct
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable so that indirect effects were not
overestimated. The method used bootstrapping to resample the data (5000 times) in estimating
indirect effects. Variables were coded so that higher values indicated greater levels of that
factor, for example greater concern or greater levels of personal engagement.
We examined mitigation responses using two outcome variables – behavioural intentions to
act on climate change and support for climate change policies6.
For the behavioural intentions measure the full model explained 25 % of variance (R2 =
0.25, F(7,1115) = 53.05, p < 0.01; 14 deleted cases due to missing data, N = 1123) and
significant indirect effects were found for all three of the mediators (Fig. 2a). Direct flooding
experience exerted an indirect effect on behavioural intentions through higher negative
emotions associated with the EWE (B = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95 % confidence intervals 0.006–
0.046), increased concern (B = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95 % confidence intervals 0.013–0.092), and
higher personal issue salience with climate change (B = 0.05, SE = 0.02, 95 % confidence
intervals 0.018–0.079). There was no direct effect of experience on behavioural intentions.
Key demographic variables (gender, age and social grade) were included in the analysis to
ensure any effects found were not due to their influence7.
For policy support the full model accounted for 22 % of variance (R2 = 0.22, F(7,1111) =
45.39, p < 0.01; 18 deleted cases due to missing data, N = 1119). Direct flooding experience
exerted an indirect effect on policy support through increased concern (B = 0.07, SE = 0.03,
95 % confidence intervals 0.015–0.123), higher personal issue salience with climate change
(B = 0.04, SE = 0.01, 95 % confidence intervals 0.013–0.068). No indirect effect was found for
negative emotions associated with the EWE (B = 0.01, SE = 0.01, 95 % confidence intervals
−0.006–0.039); see Fig. 2b.
Here there was a direct effect of experience on policy support, which became non-
significant once the indirect effects are accounted for, indicating that the mediators included
explain the relationship observed. Key demographic variables were included to ensure any
effects found were not due to their influence8.
5 We opted to include climate change concern as a mediator even though it was not found to be significantly
different across the national and flood-affected sample in section 3.2. This decision was made because climate
change concern has consistently been shown to be an important predictor of general risk perception in previous
research in this area (Roser-Renouf and Nisbet 2008). In addition, the analysis in 3.2 applied strict Bonferroni
adjustments to the significance threshold; climate change concern was at a marginal level of significance using
this method.
6 Means and standard deviations for these variables are as follows: Behavioural intentions to mitigate climate
change in the national sample (Mean = 3.64, SD = 0.78) and flood-affected sample (Mean = 3.71, SD= 0.83);
support for climate change mitigation policies in the national sample (Mean = 3.33, SD = 0.94) and the flood
affected sample (Mean = 3.61, SD = 0.88)
7 Gender did not significantly predict behavioural intentions (b = .-0.05, SE = 0.042, p = 0.22), however age
(b = .-0.01, SE = 0.001, p < 0.05) and social grade (b = .-0.04, SE = 0.019, p < 0.05) negatively predict behav-
ioural intentions whereby younger respondents and those in more affluent social grades are more likely to intent
to change their behaviour.
8 Gender did not significantly predict policy support (b = 0.09, SE = 0.052, p = 0.07), however age (b = .-0.004,
SE = 0.013, p < 0.05) and social grade (b = .-0.07, SE = 0.024, p < 0.05) negatively predict policy support
whereby younger respondents and those in more affluent social grades are more likely to support climate policies.
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3.4 Hypothesis 4: Non-flood adaptation intentions
We also examined attitudes towards adaptation, focussing on non-flood related adaptation
measures to test whether the increased salience of climate change found in the earlier analysis
translates to other domains, in this case intentions to prepare for a heat wave9; see Fig. 2c. The
same mediation model as reported in section 3.3 was used with the dependent variable
changed to heat wave adaptation intentions. The full model accounted for 10 % of the variance
(R2 = 0.10, F(7,1109) = 16.64, p < 0.01; 20 deleted cases due to missing data, N = 1117). Direct
experience of flooding exerted an indirect effect on greater intentions to prepare for a heat
wave through negative emotions associated with the flooding (B = 0.08, SE = 0.03, 95 %
confidence intervals 0.037–0.140) and heightened concern about climate change (B = 0.05,
SE = 0.02, 95 % confidence intervals 0.011–0.088). No effects were found for personal issue
salience (B = 0.02, SE = 0.01, 95 % confidence intervals −0.003–0.045).
We did find that flooding experience in this case directly (albeit marginally) influenced
adaptation intentions; however this becomes non-significant once mediators are accounted for
indicating the mediators explain this relationship. Key demographic variables were included to
ensure any effects found are not due to their influence10.
4 Discussion
We used a rigorous methodological design to establish whether the 2013/14 UK winter
flooding influenced climate change perceptions, and to assess the processes by which this
occurred. Our analysis revealed a heightened personal salience of climate change issues, an
increased concern about climate change, and the experience of negative emotions following
flooding experiences. These perceptual changes not only translate into an increased propensity
to take personal climate change mitigation actions, but also appear to trigger broader intentions
beyond this, including support for mitigation policies and intentions to adapt to another
potential climate impact (heatwaves).
We conclude that climate change becomes more cognitively available following flooding
experiences, in line with the operation of the availability heuristic (Weber 2010; Keller et al.
2006; Taylor et al. 2014a) – also indicated by the finding that those with flooding experience
perceive higher levels of personal and local area threat from climate change. This mechanism
is important both for prompting personal behavioural intentions to act on climate change and
for the support of climate-related policy. Personal issue salience is not a significant mediator
for the relationship between flooding and heatwave adaptation however, most likely due to
differences in issue focus; here increased concern and emotional responses following flooding
experiences appear to be more important drivers of intentions to act. Indeed, by including a
measure of negative emotion associated with the flooding event, we provide insight into the
role these might play in the link between EWE experience and subsequent climate change
engagement. Here we find that negative emotions mediated flooding experiences for behav-
ioural intentions to both mitigate and adapt to climate risks, but this relationship was not
9 Means and standard deviations for heat wave adaptation intentions in the national sample (Mean = 2.49, SD=
1.00) and flood-affected sample (Mean = 3.67, SD = 1.21).
10 Gender (b = 0.02, SE = 0.070, p = 0.760) and social grade (b = -0.04, SE = 0.032, p = 0.232) did not signifi-
cantly predict adaptation intentions, however younger respondents displayed stronger intentions to adapt to heat
waves (b = -0.004, SE = 0.02, p < 0.05).
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observed for policy support. This suggests that people’s support for climate change policies is
less affect-driven compared to personal action intentions, perhaps given that these constitute
more abstract decisions about wider society (see Ziegler and Tunney 2012).
4.1 Implications
The influence of flooding experience on climate change perceptions in this study was
found to be important for a range of theoretically predicted constructs, although it should
also be noted not across all measures. Nonetheless, it is important to understand how
people’s experiences with extreme weather might influence their engagement with
climate risks, especially in a context where EWEs are predicted to increase in frequency
and severity (Huntingford et al. 2014). The findings speak to the importance of a societal
discourse or narrative around extreme weather that includes climate change. Communi-
cating about the risks of flooding and other EWEs may provide a powerful overarching
narrative about climate impacts for engaging local and wider publics about rising climate
risks (Wallace 2012; Messling et al. 2015). While communicating about the need for
policy responses, and the importance of personal action to mitigate and adapt to climate
change must be carried out with sensitivity to the substantial harmful consequences
encountered by those whose lives have been disrupted by these events, we suggest
communications should not shy away from making links between extreme weather and
climate change, where appropriate.
Of course, the exact process of how someone comes to link one or more extreme weather
events to climate change is likely to vary by type of experience, over time, and by other aspects
of the background social and political context. For example, in some cases this might not be a
particularly conscious process, and may develop gradually over time. Equally, we would argue
that this is less likely to occur if the media, elite figures, local groups or other societal actors are
silent on the matter (Corner 2014). Accordingly, incorporating climate change into discussions
about extreme weather early (i.e. in advance of events), coherently and alongside actionable
advice on how to prepare is likely to be beneficial for the future resilience of at-risk
communities (Messling et al. 2015).
In this regard, climate change communication is often framed solely as a matter of fostering
mitigation action. But, in the face of rising climate risks, support for climate related policies
and the nature of public adaptation responses will become increasingly important for social
sciences research (Moser 2014; Dessai and Sims 2010; Pidgeon and Fischhoff 2011). We find
for the first time that EWE experience in one domain translates to intentions to prepare for
other types of climate impacts such as heat-waves. This remains a promising line of further
inquiry, particularly since adaptation actions, unlike many mitigation options, are often located
at the local or personal level. Theoretically, however, there remains much more work to be
done to understand the precise psychological and social processes by which our perception of
climate change becomes more relevant at a local and personal level (Brugger et al. 2015).
4.2 Limitations and future considerations
Methodologically, this and previous studies demonstrate that the ‘experience–climate change
perceptions’ link is a difficult relationship to untangle. In order to draw definitive casual
conclusions longitudinal studies are needed. However, even for such studies it could be argued
that the act of repeatedly taking part in ‘climate change surveys’ might itself affect people’s
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perceptions (e.g. raising issue salience, triggering motivated reasoning processes) in ways
which would be absent in people who have not been part of such a cohort.
For practical reasonswewere not able to utilise a longitudinal design in the current study, however
we believe this study demonstrates improved methodological rigour by focusing on a specific EWE
and clearly conceptualising and defining ‘experience’, a consideration which has been mostly absent
in the previous literature. There are also a number of further lines of inquiry which might yield
important further insights. These might include examining effects of different types of experiences
(e.g. indirect experiences, such as involvement in a community response to an EWE) and different
types of EWEs (drought, heat waves; e.g. Lefevre et al. 2015). A further extension of the current
research would be to examine how political and personal ideology interacts with EWEs, as this has
been shown to be a key determinant of climate change perceptions in both the UK and US (see e.g.
Capstick et al. 2015b). Myers et al. (2013), for example, have suggested that experience might only
influence people’s belief in climate change if they do not have strong sceptical beliefs to begin with.
Adding to the growing research in this area, the current study provides further confidence
that direct experience of having been flooded has the potential to influence a person’s
engagement with climate change. Finally, this study indicates that suitably framed narratives
around climate impacts, extreme weather and rising climate risks might offer a productive
route to greater engagement of various publics with climate change.
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